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I. INTRODUCTION

Appellees, two Alabama state employees, suffered from serious physical
illnesses, which caused them to need special work accommodations. 1
Appellees sued the state of Alabama in federal court seeking monetary
damages under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), which provides
in pertinent part that employers, including state governments and agencies,2
shall not discriminate against otherwise qualified individuals who are
disabled. 3 The ADA also provides that an employer must make "reasonable

• This Case Comment received the Huber C. Hurst Award for outstanding case comment
for Spring 2002. This Comment is dedicated to my parents, Scott and Patricia, who have given me
all the support I have ever needed.
1. Bd. of Trustees v. Garrett, 121 S. Ct. 955,961 (2001). Appellee, Patricia Garrett, was
diagnosed with breast cancer and underwent treatment which required her to miss a lot of time
from work. Id. Appellee, Milton Ash, suffered from asthma which was aggravated by exposure
to carbon monoxide and cigarette smoke. He was also diagnosed with sleep apnea Id.
2. Id. at 960.
3. 43 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2001) ("No covered entity shall discriminate against a qualified
individual with a disability because of the disability of such individual in regard to job application
procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee compensation, job
training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment.").
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accommodations" for employees who suffer from a disability. 4 Appellees
claimed that the actions that Alabama took upon learning of their
disabilities violated the ADA. 5 The U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of Alabama found that the ADA did not properly abrogate the
state's Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit in federal court and
granted appellant's motion for summary judgment.6 Appellees appealed to
the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, which reversed the district court and
found that Congress had acted within its enforcement powers under the
Fourteenth Amendment when it provided that states could be sued under
the ADA. 7 The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari on the question of
whether the abrogation of state immunity in the ADA was a valid exercise
of Congressional power. 8 The Court reversed and remanded the case to the
Eleventh Circuit9 and HELD, that Congress had not acted within its
Fourteenth Amendment powers when it allowed states to be sued in federal
court for money damages under the ADA. 10

II. THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT PROVIDES IMMUNITY
The Eleventh Amendment to the U.S. Constitution expressly provides
a state with immunity from law suits in federal court when the suit is filed
by a citizen of another state.U The U.S. Supreme Court extended that
protection to include immunity from suits against a state filed by a citizen

4. Id. § 12112(b){5)(A) ("[T]he tenn 'discriminate' includes ... not making reasonable
accommodations to the known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified individual
with a disability who is an applicant or employee, unless such covered entity can demonstrate that
the accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the operation of the business of such
covered entity.").
5. Bd. of Trustees, 121 S. Ct. at 960-61. In Board a/Trustees, Garrett was informed that
because she was missing work time, due to her cancer treatment, she would have to give up the
Director of Nursing position that she held. Id. at 961. Ash requested certain changes to his shift
and working environment to accommodate his illnesses. The requests were denied by his state
employer. Id
6. Id.; see Garrett v. Bd. ofTrustees, 989 F. Supp. 1409, 1410, 1412 (N.D. Ala. 1998).
7. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5 {"The Congress shall have power to enforce, by
appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article"); Garrett v. Bd. of Trustees, 193 F.3d 1214,
1218 (11th Cir. 1999).
8. Bd. ofTrustees v. Garrett, 529 U.S. 1065, 1065 (2000).
9. Bd of Trustees, 121 S. Ct. at 968.
10. Id.
11. U.S. CONST. amend. XI {"The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed
to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States
by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.").
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of that state. 12 While Congress can abrogate the Eleventh Amendment
immunity enjoyed by the states, it must act according to a constitutional
grant of power, as the Court ruled in Seminole Tribe of Florida v.
Florida. 13
In Seminole Tribe, the appellants sued the state of Florida in federal
court under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, alleging that the state had
failed to enter into negotiations with the tribe over gaming activities that it
wished to conduct on its reservation. 14 Among the provisions of the Act
was a requirement that the states enter into good faith negotiations
governing gaming activities. 15 This right to fair negotiations was
enforceable in U.S. district courts. 16 Thus, Congress had abrogated the
states' Eleventh Amendment immunity for suits brought under the Act.
The U.S. Supreme Court, focusing on whether Congress could abrogate
the states' immunity under the Act, found that there were only two sources
from which Congress could derive such power. 17 In the past, one of the
sources was Congress's Article I Commerce Clause power.18 However, the
Court in Seminole Tribe decided to overrule precedent allowing abrogation
under the Commerce Clause, and found that Article I could not be a source
for such Congressional action. 19 Therefore, the federal courts did not have
proper jurisdiction over the action involved in this matter. 20 However, the

12. See Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 15 (1890). The U.S. Supreme Court turned to history
and the intent of the original framers of the U.S. Constitution to extend the protection granted by
the Eleventh Amendment to the states to suits brought by citizens against the state in which they
reside.
13. 517 U.S. 44, 72-73 (1996).
14. Id. at 52.
15. Id. at 49 (citing 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(3) which provides in pertinent part,
Any Indian tribe having jurisdiction over the Indian lands upon which ... gaming
activity is being conducted ... shall request the State in which such lands are
located to enter into negotiations for the purpose of entering into a ... compact
governing the conduct of gaming activities. Upon receiving such a request, the
State shall negotiate with the Indian tribe in good faith ...).
16. Id (citing 25 U.S. C. § 2710(d)(7)(A)(i) providing that "The United States district courts
shall have jurisdiction over any cause of action initiated by an Indian tribe arising from the failure
of a State to enter into negotiations ...").
17. Id. at 59.
18. Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 59 (citing Penn. v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1 (1989)).
19. Id. at 72.
20. Id. at 73.
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Court upheld precedent establishing Section Five of the Fourteenth
Amendment as an additional source for Eleventh Amendment abrogation. 21
The U.S. Supreme Court addressed the second source of abrogation of
state immunity from suit in federal court in Kimel v. Florida Board of
Regents. 22 In Kimel, the appellants filed suit against their state employers
under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA). 23
While the U.S. Supreme Court interpreted the statute to mean that
Congress had expressly intended to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment,24
the Court ruled that this abrogation was not within the powers granted to
Congress by the Enforcement Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 25
Based on precedent, the Court ruled, that age was not a suspect
classification. Thus, any state action taken according to such a classification
must only satisfy rational basis review. 26 The Court found that Congress
failed to identify a pattern of age discrimination that was not rationally
related to a legitimate state interest in the ADEA. 27 As a result, the Court
ruled that Congress overstepped its Fourteenth Amendment powers by
abrogating immunity under this statute. 28
Ill. A RATIONAL BASIS TEST
In Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 29 the U.S. Supreme Court found
that classifications based on mental disability like the age classification in
Kimel, need only pass a rational basis test. In Cleburne, the appellee
requested a special use permit3° for a parcel of land to be used as a group

21. Id. at 65-66.
22. 528 U.S. 62 (2000).
23. Id. at 66-67 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(l) which provides that it is unlawful for an
employer "to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual . . . with respect to his
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's age");
id. at 70-71 (The appellants in this case, a group of librarians, all over the age of forty, who
worked for the state university system argued that the state of Florida's failure to provide
previously agreed upon salary adjustments had a disparate impact on older employees and thus
violated the ADEA.).
24. Id at 73-74.
25. Id. at 82-83.
26. Id. at 83.
27. Kimel, 528 U.S. at 89.
28. Id. at 91.
29. 473 U.S. 432,446 (1985).
30. The land on which the group home was to be located was zoned in such a way that,
among other uses, it could be used for apartments, boarding houses, fraternity or sorority houses,
or hospitals. Id. at 436 n.3.
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home for mentally handicapped adults. 31 The permit was·denied by the
city. 32 The appellee challenged the city's decision, arguing that it
discriminated against mentally handicapped people in violation ofthe Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 33
In ruling that the city's denial of the permit was unconstitutional, the
U.S. Supreme Court held that state action which made classifications based
on mental disability only needs to satisfy rational basis review. 34 According
to the Court, the mentally handicapped are not a suspect, or even quasisuspect, class and thus any classification based on this characteristic only
needs to be rationally related to a legitimate state interest. 35 The Court also
expressed concern that, should it find the mentally disabled to be a suspect
class, determining who belongs within the class would be difficult because
of the varying degrees of mental disability. 36
In the instant case, the U.S. Supreme Court followed the precedent set
forth in Cleburne, holding that the physically disabled are not a suspect
class, and therefore laws which classify on this basis only need to satisfy the
rational basis standard. 37 The Court found that the failure of states to make
special accommodations for the disabled did not violate the Fourteenth
Amendment as long as the refusal to accommodate is rationally related to
a legitimate governmental interest. 38
The Court, having determined that the disabled are not a suspect class,
turned as it did in Kimel, to the question of whether Congress had identified
an irrational pattern of state action directed at the disabled. 39 Despite the
fact that the legislative record included several apparently discriminatory

31. Id. at 437.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 446-48.
35. Id. at 446. The U.S. Supreme Court argued that the legislative response, both at the
national and state level proved that the problems of the mentally handicapped are being addressed
by legislatures and that there is no need for the judiciary to apply heightened scrutiny to state
action affecting this group. Id. at 443.
36. Id. at 442-43. The U.S. Supreme Court stated "[A]s the testimony in this record
indicates, they range from, those whose disability is not immediately evident to those who must
be constantly cared for ... How this large and diversified group is to be treated under the law is
a difficult and often a technical matter ...." Id.
37. Bd. of Trustees v. Garrett, 121 S. Ct. 955, 964 (2001).
38. Id.
39. Id. The U.S. Supreme Court stated "Once we have determined the metes and bounds
of the constitutional right in question, we examine whether Congress identified a history and
pattern of unconstitutional employment discrimination by the States against the disabled ...
[C]ongress' § 5 authority is appropriately exercised only in response to state transgressions." Id.
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examples of state action taken against the disabled, 40 the Court ruled that
the examples were, at best, minimal evidence of possible discrimination,41
and that Congress had not shown a pattern of unconstitutional abuse by the
states. 42 Thus, abrogation under the ADA was not an appropriate action for
Congress. 43

IV. ABROGATION Is NOT APPROPRIATE UNDER ADA
The holding in the instant case that abrogation was not appropriate
under the ADA continued the trend of construing the powers of Congress
as abrogating the Eleventh Amendment in a narrow fashion. 44 The U.S.
Supreme Court raised the bar that Congress must cross when it abrogates
Eleventh Amendment immunity in accordance with the legislative branch's
Fourteenth Amendment enforcement powers. 45 When combined with the
Court's ruling in Seminole Tribe that the Commerce Clause was not a
source for Congressional abrogation, this higher standard made it much
more difficult for private citizens to enforce rights granted to them by
federal law. 46
Garrett can be criticized for several reasons, including its dismissal of
evidence in the legislative record that indicated a pattern of employment
discrimination against the disabled by the states, which could have justified
abrogation pursuant to Congress's Commerce Clause power. 47 The

40. Id. at 965. The U.S. Supreme Court cited several examples of discrimination that were
included in the ADA's legislative record including an administrator at the University of North
Carolina who refused to hire a person because he was blind, a student in South Dakota being
denied the opportunity to practice teaching because of blindness, and a state worker who was fired
in Kansas because he suffered from epilepsy. Id.
41. Id.
42. Bd. ofTrustees, 121 S. Ct. at 965-66 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1210l(a)(l), the U.S. Supreme
Court relied on data that Congress used in enacting the ADA that found there were 43 million
people who suffered from some sort of mental or physical disability and the states employed 4.5
million people. The Court found that when compared with these numbers the evidence Congress
had assembled as to instances of discrimination was minimal.).
43. Id. at 968.
44. See generally, e.g., Note: The Irrational Application ofRational Basis: Kimel, Garrett,
and Congressional Power to Abrogate State Sovereign Immunity, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2146(2001)
(providing an overview of the U.S. Supreme Court's narrowing of the abrogation of the Eleventh
Amendment through the application of rational basis review).
45. Id. at 2147.
46. Id. at 2169.
4 7. Bd. of Trustees, 121 S. Ct. at 969-70 (Breyer, J., dissenting) In responding to the
majorities' finding of only minimal evidence of state discrimination against the disabled, the
dissent states "Congress compiled a vast legislative record documenting 'massive society-wide
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majority cited several of these instances, but dismissed them as only
"minimal evidence of unconstitutional state discrimination in employment
against the disabled. " 48 However, the record contained over three hundred
instances of discrimination by states alone, along with numerous instances
of discrimination by society at large. 49 Such large numbers would seem to
indicate that, despite the majority's holding, there was a pattern of
unconstitutional discrimination against disabled individuals by the states,
which justifies Congressional abrogation of state immunity. 50
However, regardless of the number of examples of discrimination
contained in the record, the majority also suggested that it could not tell
whether the instances were irrationally based and thus unconstitutional. 51
The U.S. Supreme Court explained that the incidents were not fully
described, making it impossible for the rational basis test to be applied. 52
The Court appeared to be demanding the sort of evidentiary standards
required in a court of law. 53 Precedent had not required Congress to meet
such a standard. 54 The instant decision made the situations under which
Congress can abrogate the Eleventh Amendment narrower because it
appeared that the Court required Congress to gather more evidence in
order to find a pattern of discrimination sufficient to trigger the Fourteenth
Amendment. 55

discrimination,' against persons with disabilities." Id. (dissent quoting testimony of Justin Dart,
Chairperson, Rights and Empowerment of Americans with Disabilities Task Force).The dissent
documented that Congress held 13 hearings to discuss the matter and created a special task force
that was attended by "more than 30,000 people, including thousands who had experienced
discrimination first hand." Id.
48. Id. at 965-66.
49. Id. at 970 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
50. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting) (Justice Breyer stated that "the powerful evidence of
discriminatory treatment throughout society in general, including discrimination by private persons
and local governments, implicates state governments as well, for state agencies form part of that
same larger society.").
51. Id. at 965.
52. Bd. of Trustees, 121 S. Ct. at 965. The U.S. Supreme Court states "several of these
incidents undoubtedly evidence an unwillingness on the part of state officials to make the sort of
accommodations for the disabled required by the ADA. Whether they were irrational under our
decision in Cleburne is more debatable, particularly when the incident is described out of
context." Id.
53. Id. at 972 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
54. Id. at 971 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 652-56
(1966)).
55. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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V. CONCLUSION: THE EXCLUSIVE POWER OF CONGRESS
The U.S. Supreme Court can be criticized because the rules that restrain
the judiciary from drawing conclusions without sufficient evidence do not
apply to legislative determinations. 56 While some may question the ability
of Congress to properly carry out fact-finding functions, 57 there is no
reason to require the legislature to adhere to the strict standards of the
judiciary. 58 As evidenced by the legislative record in the instant case,
Congress has the ability to gather facts from across the nation and from the
broad group of constituents which elect its members. 59 Thus, Congress's
mission is much different from that of a court and it should not be limited
by constraints that regulate a branch of government that does not have such
powers. 60
In addition, under Section Five ofthe Fourteenth Amendment, Congress
is given exclusive power to enforce that Amendment. 61 To scrutinize a
decision of Congress as closely as the U.S. Supreme Court did in the instant
.case, and to require it to follow judicial rules, takes that power away from
the legislative branch. 62 When the Court allowed this to take place, a
violation of the doctrine of separation of powers occurred because the U.S.

56. Id. at 972-73 (citing Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970) (Brennan, White,
Marshall, J.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) and FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc.,
508 U.S. 307 (1993)). The dissent in Beach Communications argued that the restraints required
of judges should not be applied to Congress, particularly in this case because "rational basis
review - with its presumptions favoring constitutionality- is 'a paradigm ofjudicial restraint."'
Id.
57. Neal Devins, Congressional Factfinding and the Scope of Judicial Review: A
Preliminary Analysis, 50 DUKE L.J. 1169, 1182-84 (2001) (stating in general that there is an
argument that Congress will not take fact-finding seriously and that the quality of the legislative
record may be compromised by a number of variables. Thus, courts may in fact do a better job of
fact-finding.).
58. Bd. ofTrustees, 121 S. Ct. at 971 (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("[C]ongress, unlike courts,
must, and does, routinely draw general conclusions . . . from anecdotal and opinion-based
evidence ... particularly when the evidence lacks strong refutation.").
59. Id. at 973 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
60. Id. Justice Breyer stated "To apply a rule designed to restrict courts as if it restricted
Congress' legislative power is to stand the underlying principle - a principle ofjudicial restraint
- on its head." Id.
61. Id. at 975-76 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
62. Id. at 976 (Breyer, J., dissenting). In discussing the majority decisions, Justice Breyer
states, "Its decision saps§ 5 of independent force, effectively 'confining the legislative power ...
to the insignificant role of abrogating only those state laws that the judicial branch [is] prepared
to adjudge unconstitutional."' Id. (citing Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 648-49 (1966)).
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Constitution has expressly granted the power to enforce the Fourteenth
Amendment to the legislature, not to the judiciary.63 Thus, the Court should
grant a great deal of judicial deference to decisions made by that body. 64
Because the U.S. Supreme Court in the instant case required Congress
to meet a higher standard of fact-finding with regards to legislation
involving classes of people not deemed to be suspect, the already narrow
power of Congress to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment under Section
Five powers was further limited. While individuals may still sue a state for
an injunction, in some cases that remedy may be insufficient ifthe harm has
already occurred. In those instances, individuals who have had a right
granted to them by the federal government, but taken from them by the
state, no longer have a remedy unless the Court finds Congress's
fact-finding to be sufficient. The Court's decision in Garrett should be
seen as a violation of separation of powers that hinders Congressional
power to enforce the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment.

63. Bd. ofTrustees, 121 S. Ct. at 975-76 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Justice Breyer states, "The
Court through its evidentiary demands, its non-deferential review, and its failure to distinguish
between judicial and legislative constitutional competencies, improperly invades a power that the
Constitution assigns to Congress." Id. (citing Morgan, 384 U.S. at 648 n.7).
64. Id. at 973 (Breyer, J., dissenting).

